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ABSTRACT
Limit pricing oligopoly market is a hypothetical market explained with various
hypotheses in the literature which has limited scope for the real world economic
evidence and its application which leads the impact of the operation of such market is
mostly unknown among the policymakers and academics. The available literature
evidences are mostly neglected to explore the scope of such markets conditions and
failed to direct appropriate policies.
In India among most of the national level parties and in the states levels there are two
only have been surviving over the long periods. This trigger the intuition to inquire into
answer the questions a) why the political market is appears to be an oligopolistic
market? b) How it maintain the limit pricing policy to deter the entry of new ? c) How
the share the market? d) Are they collusive oligopolistic or non collusive? e) Are they
price leadership oligopolist or not? f) How could they operate in the long run while
some of them closed it even within the short run? Since there are very limited attempts
only are available to answers this question. This calls for an enquiry by incorporating
the micro economics theory with the political system. This paper is attempted to fill this
gap in research.
Key words: Limit Pricing Oligopoly, Oligopolitics, Breaking the Oligopoly Politics,
Collusive and Non Collusive Politics, Entry Prevention in Politics
JEL Classifications:
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PREMISES AND ISSUES
Everything is a product in economics and every product has its own market.
Competiveness determines the quality and the price of the product. If the competition is
higher in a market than more quality products would be made available and vice versa.
This basic rule of the market can be applied to all the market and the political market is
not an exemption to it. Operation of more number of in a country can be than
conceptualized as easy availability of various forms of political products and services in
the economy and vice versa. In India for the past seven decades the political markets is
dominated as duopolistic politics by Congress and that of Bharathiya Janatha Party
(BJP) with the barrier to entry or survive. The effect of such long lasting limit pricing
nature of the political system and how far it disturbed the welfare of the public by
preventing the healthy competition in the political market is largely unknown which
warrant economist to make an enquiry into the inter relationship between the micro
economics theory of limit pricing oligopoly market and the politics. For this purpose the
suitable political set up similar to limit pricing oligopoly market of Tamilnadu is chosen
with the following research question
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

What makes the political market duopolistic?
What is the process of oligopolistic political market when new one enters?
How profitability of oligopolistic politics for both the public and the parties?
What are the impacts and implications of oligopolistic politics in India?
How do the existing fix the limit pricing policies?
In what terms they create barrier to entry?
How do they succeed in the barrier or entry prevention for the long run?
How to break the entry prevention polices of the oligopolitics and increase the
public welfare through competition?

The pre requests of attempt to answer these above questions is lies with the sound
understanding of the earlier relevant research done on this topic which are shortlisted
below.
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Andrew Sweeting, James W. and Robertsy Chris Gedge (2016) have studied about the
dynamic limit pricing with an application to the airline industry and developed a
dynamic limit pricing model where an incumbent repeatedly signals information
relevant to a potential entrant's expected profitability. The model is tractable, with a
unique equilibrium under refinement. The researchers shows that model provides a
plausible explanation for why incumbent airlines cut prices dramatically on routes
threatened with entry by southwest airlines by providing new evidence that
incumbents sought to deter entry, showing that other suggested explanations are
inconsistent with the data, and demonstrating that our model can predict the size of
cuts observed in the data when we parameterize it to capture the main features of these
routes.
Based on the Gini coefficient, Franco Modigliani 1958 suggest in his new developments
on the oligopoly front that concentration had tend to increase the appreciation of the
limit pricing over a period. Bhagwati, J. N., (1970) in his paper titled oligopoly theory,
entry prevention and growth he highlighted about the various options of entry
prevention price available to the established firms and justify how the firm will set the
limit price to achieve maximum profit even in the short run.
Christopher Gedge, James W. Roberts and Andrew Sweeting (2014) has applied the
limit pricing theory of oligopoly in the airline industry and the potential and actual
entry on the distribution of the airline prices. By mathematically constructing the
incumbent market by carrier and by constructing the market size, they have
developed theoretical and empirical frameworks for analyzing a classic form of
strategic behavior of entry deterrence by setting a low price.
Curwen P.J. (1976) in his contribution titled the role of entry in oligopoly: the theory
of the firm he argued that the literature on entry has become very extensive over the
years. Although the question of entry-preventing behavior was first raised by
Kaldor, the main discussion arose out of the basic prediction of the model of
monopolistic competition that firms would earn only normal profits in the long run,
and that each firm would be operating with excess capacity. Harrod argued that firms
would forgo some potential profit in the short run by setting a price lower level that
which would maximize their profits in order to discourage new entrants into the
industry. Subsequently, the discussion of the role of entry has largely evolved into an
3

attempt to provide answer to the question as to whether it is more profitable for a firm
to maximize short-run profits in the knowledge that this will attract new entrants and
hence erode the firm’s market share in the long run, or for a firm to deter entry by
holding down prices in the short run in the expectation that it will be able to retain a
substantial share of the market over time.
Dale K. Osborne (1964) has argued about the role of entry in oligopoly theory and
highlighted about the various types of barrier to entry. Pashigian, B. (1968) work titled
limit price and the market share of the leading firm provides the detailed explanation of
why the market share of the leading firm did not decline. He also noted that it may be
more profitable in some cases to set the limit price and accept the
entry and justifies how Bain and Modigliani have largely ignored the discrepancy
between the limit price and the competitive price. David B Baron (1973) has
investigated the effect of potential entry and barriers to entry on the price and
profitability of the firm and proved the concept that the potentials to the entry will
attract the new firms.
Eichner, A. (1974) studies about the determination of the mark-up under oligopoly and
discussed bout the various cost conditions of the oligopolies by providing an extended
micro economics theory of the oligopolistic firm with time horizon differentiating from
the traditional micro economic theory.
Fisher, F. (1959) in his work titled new developments on the oligopoly front: cournot
and the Bain-Sylos analysis reviewed the model presented by Modigliani and tested
the importance implication of Sylos postulate. Frank Bass Ernan Haruvy Ashutosh
Prasad(2006) in thier variable pricing in oligopoly market they stressed about how the
oligopoly market as Price variability affects consumer sensitivity to price and product
differences. This conclusion arises from two streams of literature. However, slight
differences in behavioral specifications in the literatures were found to cause
diametrically opposite pricing implications for firms. In the “payoff sensitivity”
specification, as variability increases, consumer attention to quality and price
differences falls. Hence, lower-quality, lower-priced firms can compete better.
George, K. (1968) analyzed bout the concentration, barriers to entry and rates of return.
Using the leading companies in the industries and their concentration ratios he
explained about the barrier to entry possibilities and the process involves in the setting
of limit pricing.
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John T. Wenders, (1071) also studied about the collusion and entry and analyze the
problems faced by collusive oligopolist through the limit pricing models. With the
above the limit price model they have analyzed three problems wise when should the
collusive firms lower industry price to the limit price to prevent further entry?, under
what conditions it will work and what model can be adopted to the price leadership.
John T. Wenders,( 1967) explains about the entry and monopoly pricing by
superimposing the maximizing price is the same for all firms and equal to the
monopoly price and discover how products in the long run. Jos´E Azar (2012) studied
about the oligopoly and its implicit collusion through portfolio
diversification and
concluded that if the ownership of the firms is more concentrated, collusion
could
potentially be easier, because the agency problem would be less
intense.
Kamien, M. I., & Schwartz, N. L. (1971) have studied about the limit pricing and
uncertain entry and provides solution for optimal control, problems with single and
multiple control variables. By excluding some of the problems associated with the limit
pricing theory such as motivation and the knowledge about various strategies the new
entrant left unsolved the attempt concludes that current price policy types of cartels in
limit pricing will provide normal profit for the industry in the long run. Again 1972 the
same authors has released an article titled uncertain entry and excess capacity and
discovered about the pre nd post entry capacity of the firm in the determination of the
limit pricing.
Koutsoyiannis (1979) has delineated the limit pricing oligopoly model of Sylos Labini
and numerically proved that how a potential entrants can be restricted from entry into
the industry by the existing firms and willing to receive minimum profit instead of
obtaining the supernormal profit.
Osborne, D. (1965) analyzed about the entry in oligopoly market and explained how
that new entrants can violate the Sylos postulates and damage the theory. Mann, H.
(1966) has made an enquiry about the concepts of seller concentration, barriers to entry,
and rates of return in thirty Industries. Using the data base of thirty industries from
1936-1951 the relationships between the barrier to entry and the sales concentration of
the firms studied and proved the findings of bains that at the initial stage the firms
would be to accumulate the influence of the market and the high rate if returns
potentials which will reduce after the entry of the new firms.
Preston, J. (1988) in his work titled regulation, competition and market structure: A
literature reviews the stages of bus industry and he concluded two concepts. First the
5

deregulation will lead to overall high fare and high frequency combinations in areas of
heavy demand with areas of low demand which left unserved. Secondly the
deregulation will lead to distinct qualities being offered in different fares. In particular,
high frequencies will be offered at high fares for those with high values of time, whilst
low frequencies with low fares will be offered for those with low values of time.
Robert E. Hall (2008) has researched into the potential competition, limit pricing, and
price elevation from exclusionary conduct and found that the implications of the
modern analysis of limit pricing are ambiguous on this point. Modern dynamic models
of potential competition recognize that incumbent firms may employ strategies that
trade off some reduction in prices before entry to deter entry and thereby avoid the
larger reduction in price that would occur upon entry of a rival. As a result, antitrust
law should strategies that involve reductions in price relative to more static monopoly
outcomes and be allowed even though they allow incumbent monopolists to sustain
their market power for longer periods of time.
Salary Andrade De Sa and Julien Doubanes (2014) have studied about the limit pricing
and the ineffectiveness of the carbon tax and interpreted the limit price more broadly
than the entry price of a substitute that offers drastic substitution possibilities.
Sometimes the backstop substitute needs to be developed and the falling limit price
induced by the strategic oil producer, which destroys the oil demand after some lag.
Shepherd, W. (1973) in his work revealed ideas on the entry as a substitute for
regulation reveals that how the entry of new firms can be conceptualized as the
substitutes for the regulation of the market where the usual regulatory norms fails. He
argued in favour of the new entry as it clears market imperfection through the
competitions.
Susmita Chatterjee, Srobonti Chattopadhyay, Rittwik Chatterjee and Debabrata Dutta
(2017) have studied about the public firm in mixed oligopolistic structure through
theoretical exposition and found that the choice problem of a public sector firm is
subject to additional on straints, vis a vis private firms. Profit maximization without
constraint always produces better result than constrained maximization. State owned
firm cannot charge a high price, so as to maximise profit. The social welfare
maximization obligation restricts the profit. This is known as the problem of multiple
objectives and sub optimal performance.
Sylos-Labini, P(1962) has explained about the oligopoly and technical progress
through his limit pricing oligopoly model and suggest that the entry prevention price
6

is sometime may not be profitable in the short run and would be profitable in the long
run.
Summing up the available theoretical and empirical literature it is found that there are
very few attempts only made in respect to the application and the implication of the
limit pricing theory which stimulates an intuition to inquire into finding the real world
evidence and applications of the theory of limit pricing oligopoly in the market? With
this backdrop this paper is attempted to fill this gap in research by interconnecting the
economics theory of limit pricing oligopoly with the ongoing politics of Tamilnadu.
CORE IDEA OF THE THEORY
Limit Pricing is a pricing strategy the monopolist may use to stop entry. If a monopolist
set its profit maximizing price (where MR=MC) the level of supernormal profit would
be so high and will attracts new firms into the market. Limit pricing involves reducing
the price sufficiently to deter entry. It leads to less profit than possible in short-term, but
it can enable the firm to retain its monopoly position in long-term with high
profitability.
For limit pricing to be effective, the monopolist needs to decrease the price to the point
where a new firm will not be able to make any profit by entering the market. By
discouraging entry, the incumbent firm is guaranteed an ‘easy life’ and guaranteed high
profits.
A large multinational may be willing to enter a market – even if it is unprofitable in the
short-term. The large multinational can use its reserves and profit elsewhere to
substitutes a loss of making entry. Rather than limit pricing, a firm may set the profit
maximizing price, but then react when a new firm enters. Limit pricing will be more
effective in industries with substantial economies of scale.
INTEGRATING THE LIMIT PRICING THEORY OF OLIGOPOLY AND POLITICS:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Bain formulated his ‘limit-price’ theory in an article published in 1949, several years
before his major work Barriers to New Competition which was published in 1956. His
aim in his early article was to explain why firms over a long period of time were
keeping their price at a level of demand where the elasticity was below unity, that is,
they did not charge the price which would maximize their revenue.
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His conclusion was that the traditional theory was unable to explain this empirical fact
due to the omission from the pricing decision of an important factor, namely the threat
of potential entry. Traditional theory was concerned only with actual entry, which
resulted in the long-run equilibrium of the firm and the industry (where P = LAC).
However, the price, Bain argued, did not fall to the level of LAC in the long run because
of the existence of barriers to entry, while at the same time price was not set at the level
compatible with profit maximization because of the threat of potential entry. Actually
the maintained price was set at a level above the LAC (= pure competition price) and
below the monopoly price (the price where MC = MR and short-run profits are
maximized).
This behavior can be explained by assuming that there are barriers to entry, and that the
existing firms do not set the monopoly price but the ‘limit price’, that is, the highest
price which the established firms believe they can charge without inducing entry. Now
let us enquire about this limit pricing strategy and its relevance to politics with the
following assumptions.
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS OF BAINS MODEL
1. There is a definite long-run demand curve for industry output, which is
unaffected by price adjustments of sellers or by entry. Hence the market
marginal revenue curve is determinate. This is one of the suitable assumption for
the analysis because in the political market status of MPs and MLAs for the
present and the future is definite.
2. There is effective collusion among the established oligopolist in the sense the
established collude with the others in the determination of price and the supply
of political products and services to the public.
3. The established firms can compute a limit price, below which entry will not
occur. The limit price will be set depends upon the limitation of costs of the
potential entrant, market elasticity of demand, shape and level of the LAC, the
size of the market and the number of in the industry.
4. Above the limit price, entry is attracted and there is considerable uncertainty
concerning the activities of the dominant after the entry of new firm
5. The established firms seek the maximization of their own long-run profit.
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6. The entrants react on the basis of the current price they expect the price charged
by the established firms to continue in the post-entry period.
7. The established firms are aware of the threat of potential entry.
8. The established firms can estimate correctly the limit price.
Model 1: Bains theory ant its relevance to Tamilnadu Politics
The idea of the application of the bains model of limit pricing oligopoly to tamilnadu
politics can be classified into the two sections as follows.
Case: 1: If there is No Collusion with the New

Assume that the market demand is DABD’ with the corresponding marginal revenue is
Dabm (Figure. 1). Assume further that the limit price (PL) is correctly calculated (and
known both to the existing firms and to the potential entrants). Given P L, only the part
AD’ of the demand curve and the section am of the MR are certain for the firms. The
part to the left of A, that is, DA is uncertain, because the behavior of the entrant is not
known. Whether the firms will charge the PL or not depends on the profitability of
alternatives open to them, given their costs.
9

Assume the LAC (which is uniquely determined by the addition of the LMC = LAC of
the collusive oligopolist) is LAC1. In this case two alternatives are possible. Either to
charge the PL and realize the profit PLAdPc1 with certainty or to charge the monopoly
price, that is, the price that corresponds to the intersection of LAC 1 = MC1 with the MR.
This price will be higher than PL (given LAC1), but its precise level is uncertain postentry. Thus the profits in the second alternative are uncertain and must be riskdiscounted. The firm will compare the certain profits from charging PL with the heavily
risk-discounted profits from the second ‘gamble’ alternative, and will choose the price
(PL or PM) that yields the greatest total profits. Given the entry-preventing price PC l is
defined, the alternatives choices are available to the established viz 1. To charge a price
equal to PL and prevent entry 2. To charge a price below PL and prevent entry (this will
be adopted if PM < PL). 3. To charge a price above PL and take the risks associated with
the ensuing entry. It will choose the alternative which maximizes profit.
Case: 2: If Collusion Takes Place Between Established and New :
With collusion assumed to take place between the established firms and the entrant the
model would be even easier, however with collusion the whole D curve shifts to the left
by the share which is allocated to the new entrant at each price. The new DD” curve is
known with certainty at all its points, as a consequence of the collusion, and so is the
corresponding m” which is revealed in the Figure. 2.
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In this case also there are three alternatives options are available to the firm as follows.
1. Either charge PL or exploit AD’ without entry.
2. Charge a price above PL and attract entry. The firm will eventually move to a point on
the share-of-the-market curve DD”, via collusive agreement with the new entrant.
3. Charge the profit-maximizing price PM, if PM < PL.
Among these alternatives, it will choose the one that yields maximum profits.
Then three major possibilities exist in front of the Oligopolistic:
The policy of pricing to maximize industry profit with no entry. This can be done by
fixing the price at PM. PM resulting is adopted when PL > PM, i.e. the limit price is not
operative because by charging the lower PM Price profits are maximized. Pricing to
forestall entry with the profit but industry profits not maximized this can be done by
fixing the price where PL < PM.
Pricing to maximize industry profit but with resulting entry. This implies P M > PL. This
action would be chosen if it is more profitable as compared with charging PL . The first
two situations lead to long-run equilibrium of the industry without entry or exit. The
third case implies an unstable equilibrium since entry would be taking place.

The limit price will be chosen in favour of monopoly price if the former yields
maximum long-run profits. The rationale of adopting the entry-prevention policy is
profit maximization. Whenever such a limit price is adopted it is implied that the firm
has done all the relevant calculations of profits of alternative policies
Model 2 : Sylos-Labini limit pricing theory ant its relevance to Tamilnadu Politics:
Sylos-Labini developed a model of limit-pricing based on scale-barriers to entry. The
economies-of-scale barrier is more suitable to the political market than that of Bain. He
highlighted the determinants of the limit price and discussed their implications, thus
providing the basis for Modigliani’s more general model of entry-preventing pricing.
Sylos-Labini concentrated his analysis on the case of a homogeneous oligopoly whose
technology is characterized by technical discontinuities and economies of scale.
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Assumptions:
1. The market demand is given and has unitary elasticity. The product is homogeneous
and will be sold at a unique equilibrium price. Every have their own method of doing
politics called their technology.
2. The technology consists of three types of plant small with a tiny capacity and a
medium-size with a capacity of medium output and a large-size plant with a capacity of
relatively bigger market share. Each firm can expand by multiples of its initial plant size
only. There are economies of scale cost decreases as the size of the plant increases three
cost lines corresponding to the sizes of the party.
3. The price is set by the price leader who is the largest firm, with the lowest cost at a
level low enough to prevent entry. The smaller firms are price-takers. Each one
individually cannot affect the price. But collectively they may put pressure on the
leader by regulating their output. The largest firm must set a price that is acceptable to
all the firms in the market as well as preventing entry if the collusion takes place on the
basis of the price leadership by low cost or dominant .
This is what happened in the state politics of Tamilnadu for the past few decades. Both
the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam-DMK and the Anna Dravida Munnetra KazhagamADMK have been setting the entry prevention price by making collusion with the
potential entrants like VCK, DMDK, PMK, and other small when ever political
challenges arises. Since these small sized and other newly farmed parties like Makkal
Neethi Maiyam and other are unknown about their market share they accept the
collusion with the existing parties and accept very minimum numbers of seat offered by
the existing ruling parties and face the elections.
It is to be noted that the new entrants cannot survive in the long run even if they own
political power due to the limited financial allocation offered for them from the ruling
parties. As a result they have to go in collaboration with the existing ruling parties. If
they tend to become a new competition to the already existing parties they would never
allow it and kick them out of the market by isolating and using the entry prevention
price. For example offering of free products for all the households like TV, Grinder,
Mixy, cattles like Goat and cow has not only detained the entry of the new in the state
and also it prevent even the existing experienced like DMK to stay away from the
market.
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4. There is a normal rate of profit in each industry.
5. The leader is assumed to know the cost structure of all plant sizes, and the market
demand.
6. The entrant is assumed to come into the industry with the smallest plant size and
have no capacity to adjust with loss.
7. The established firms and the entrant behave according to Sylos’s postulate which
describes that the established expect that the potential entrant will not come into the
market if he thinks that the price of post-entry will fall below his LAC and the new
political entrant expects that the established firms will never change the policies in the
post-entry period.
In addition to this assumptions specified in the theory the following additional and
realistic assumptions are also to be required to understand the implications.
8. For the sake of analysis the are assumed as the firms since they design and
implement the public welfare policies. The markets for the supply of these products are
of oligopolist since it has a few participation where as on the demand side it is perfectly
competitive market with durable goods.
9. Consumers of the political products and services or the nature of public are not
rational but act upon the rational expectation hypothesis.
10.
Are designing the products and services to the public and receive the
administrative power over the country for the long run as their rewards or revenue in
addition to the influences.
Limit Pricing Price Determination of Politics:
The market share of the is measured through the seat they owned in the loc Saba and in
the central Rajya Saba assembly in the form of number of members of the parliaments
and the number of the (MPs and MLAs) that a have. More the number of MPs and
MLAs more would be the political power and market share and vice versa. Similarly
more the power they can compete independently in all assemblies and vice versa. It is
said that the price is set by the largest, most efficient who are having high market share
and it will set the equilibrium price which must be acceptable by all the firms in the
industry, and should be at a level that prevent entry of new into the system. If the costs
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conditions of the are different, then there should be as many minimum acceptable
prices for various parties of sizes. For each party size there should to be a minimum
acceptable price to define to ensure continue the collusion. It can be defined as
Pi = TACi(1 + r)
where Pt = the minimum acceptable price for the ith size
TACi = total average cost for the ith size
r = normal profit rate of the industry
The minimum acceptable price covers to survive the TAC of the plant and the normal
(minimum) profit rate of the industry. The price leader is assumed to know the cost
structure of all plant sizes and the normal profit rate of the industry and will set the
price that is acceptable by the smallest, least efficient firms, and will deter entry. The
price tends to settle at a level immediately above the entry preventing price of the least
efficient firms, takes place with the minimum plant scale with the highest cost.
In Sylos’s model, where differential costs are assumed, the price, in order to be a longrun equilibrium one, apart from preventing entry must also be acceptable by the least
efficient firms, allowing them to earn at least the normal industry profit given that the
most efficient firm (leader) does not find it worthy to eliminate the smaller firms, either
because such action is not profitable or the leader afraid of the any intervention of the
regulatory bodies.
Clearly the medium and large-scale firms, having lower costs, will be earning abnormal
profits. But small firms will also normally will be earning some abnormal profits
without attracting entry.
Similarly the nature of limit pricing oligopoly market with reference to the state of
Tamilnadu can be explained through the following figure 3 in which line PL, PM and
PS are represents price set by the parties with very low average cost of the large
potential party or the ruling party, with medium capacity or the opposition parties and
the low efficient or the new entrants respectively. The market demand at the minimum
acceptable price Ps of the smallest, least efficient, party is X. The leader will set the limit
price PL > Ps. The price LPcorresponds to the level of output XLp = X – Xs and is the
equilibrium price because it satisfies the two necessary condition that it is acceptable by
all firms, and it deters entry, because if entry occurs the total output X L will be increased
at the level XLp + Xs = X and the price will fall to the minimum acceptable price of the
entrant, that is, to a level just below Ps.
14

The LP is indirectly determined by the total output that the established firms will sell in
the market. Given that in the long run price cannot fall below the cost of the least
efficient firm, and that the entrant can enter only with the smallest least- efficient plant
size, the leader can determine the output X at which all established firms use their
plants up to capacity. He next determines the total quantity that the firms will sell in the
industry XLp so as to prevent entry.
XL is such that if the entrant comes into the market with the minimum viable size, Xs,
the total post-entry output (XLp + Xs) will just exceed X, and hence will drive price down
to a level just below the AC of the entrant. Given XLp, the limit price LP is determined
from the market-demand curve DD. The entrant will be deterred from entering the
market because they know that if they enter they will cause the price to fall below his
AC. Any output larger than XLp is entry-preventing. It should be clear that in Sylos’s
model all firms earn abnormal profits, which are increasing with plant size and there is
an upper and a lower limit of the entry-preventing price and the equilibrium price
cannot be higher than LP not lower than Ps.
In Sylos’s model the Determinants of the Entry-Preventing Price are:
(1). There is a negative relationship between the absolute size of the market and the
limit price. The larger the market sizes the lower the entry prevention price. If there is a
dynamic increase in the demand, denoted by a shift to the right of the industry-demand
curve, the effect on the price and the structure of the industry depends on the size and
the rate of increase.
15

If the increase in demand is considerable and occurs rapidly, the existing firms will
have to set lower price initially, in anticipation of the developments on the demand
side, and build up additional capacity to meet the demand. If it failed build up capacity
fast enough to keep up with the rate of growth in demand, and then entry from new
firms or already established firms in other industries will take place.
If the growth of demand is slow, the existing firms will most probably be able to meet
the increased demand by making appropriate reserve capacity the price will not be
reduced.
(2). the elasticity of market demand is also negatively related to the limit price. The
more elasticity of the demand is, the lower the price that established firms can charge
without attracting entry. The detection of changes in the elasticity is almost impossibly
difficult in practice, and the established firms will most probably not count (and plan
ahead) on such uncertain changes in it. Thus if it change substantially, new large firms
(established elsewhere) will enter into the market, since the existing firms will not be
able to cope with such change, and the price will fall.
(3). the prices of factors of production, which, together with the technology, determine
the total average cost of the political parties. Changes in factor prices affect all the firms
in the industry in the same way. Thus an increase in factor prices will lead to an
increase in the costs and the limit price in the industry. Similarly a reduction in factor
prices will lead to a decrease in the limit price
Differentiated Oligopolitics:
Sylos extended his analysis to the case of differentiated oligopoly. Sylos argues that
when the products are differentiated the entry-barriers will be stronger than in the case
of homogeneous oligopoly due to marketing economies of scale. It seems to accept that
advertising unit costs and possibly the cost of raw materials per unit of output are likely
to fall as the scale of output increases. Hence the overall cost difference between the
smaller and larger parties will be greater as compared to the homogeneous oligopoly
case. Product differentiation, therefore, will reinforce the scale-barrier. Sylos’s analysis
of differentiated oligopoly lacks the rigors of his model of homogeneous oligopoly. He
suggests, however, that he is primarily concerned with the implications of technological
discontinuities for price and output, and that product differentiation is one of the main
concerns.
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Conclusion and Scope
Incorporating the limit pricing oligopoly with the political setup and analyzing it has
numerous limitations like the nature of products they design and deliver the market
trend and so on. The long year’s existence present both at the state of Tamilnadu and at
the central level arise due to the adoption of limit pricing and entry prevention methods
through both open collusion with every newly farmed and with the old, existing parties
even with some opposition parties by timely changing the political agendas and
through various indirect understanding and deter the entry. Beyond this entry threat if
anyone enters the exiting political firms will force and compel them to collude with the
existing firm or to loss their power and quite from political market. All this situations
clearly proves the operation of the limit pricing oligopoly market in the Tamilnadu.
In order to improve the public welfare this impact of limit pricing oligopoly in the
political market has to be break down through increasing the competition by changing
the oligopoly nature of politics into perfect competitive nature of the political markets.
The source of the breaking the oligopoly market has to be introduced through
adjustment in the democratic rules by delimiting the frequency of a and individuals to
participate in the democracy and suitable , similar approaches are to be explored
through more in-depth interdisciplinary researches.
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